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Civil Conspiracy in the Corporate Context 
 
Pey-Woan Lee* 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines the issues that arise when the tort of conspiracy by  unlawful 
means is used, as an alternative to veil-piercing, either to extend a company’s liability 
to its controllers, or to enable a controller’s creditors to reach the assets of company 
under his or her control. It observes that the tort of conspiracy is a particularly potent 
mechanism for these purposes because of its potentially broad reach. A liberal 
application of conspiracy liability to companies and their insiders would therefore 
undermine the company’s separate legal status as well as the benefits of 
incorporation. For that reason, the application of the tort, and of private law 
principles in general, is not free from the policy debates that inform veil-piercing 
cases. A keen appreciation of how these policies are engaged is therefore necessary 
for the proper delineation of the tort in the corporate context. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The term ‘economic torts’1 is commonly understood to encompass a group of 
intentional torts comprising inducing breach of contract, conspiracy, intimidation and 
causing loss by unlawful means. It seems now settled, however, that the term has no 
significance beyond indicating that these torts are frequently (but not exclusively) 
used to protect financial interests against deliberate interferences.2 There is therefore 
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. An earlier draft of this paper was 
presented at the conference entitled ‘Protecting Business and Economic Interests: Contemporary Issues 
in Tort Law’ jointly organised by the Centre for Cross-Border Commercial Law in Asia, Singapore 
Management University (School of Law), Bond University (Faculty of Law) and the Singapore 
Academy of Law and held in Singapore on 18 – 19 August 2016. I am grateful to the speakers and 
participants at the conference for their comments. I would also like to thank Professor Joachim Dietrich 
and the anonymous reviewer for their helpful suggestions for improvement. The usual caveat applies. 
1 The term ‘economic torts’ was likely popularised by J D Heydon with the publication of Economic 
Torts, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1973. 
2 This follows from the rejection by the majority Law Lords in OBG v Allen [2008] 1 AC 1 of the 
suggestion that these torts are specific instances of a ‘genus’ unlawful means tort. Attempts at 
rationalising the torts under unifying principles have been made by various authors: Heydon, above n 
1; and T Weir, Economic Torts, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997. 
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no inherent unity among them3 and the use of this term should not mislead one to 
assume that there exist particular qualities innate and common to these torts.4 That 
said, there may be practical reasons why it remains convenient to consider them 
together. One such reason is that these torts are functionally similar in that they may 
be used, in one way or another, to reach beyond the immediate perpetrator of a 
particular injury, and attach liability to those whose involvement is either indirect or 
insufficiently causative of the claimant’s injury.  
 
This ‘liability-extending’5 function of the economic torts is particularly useful in 
disputes involving corporate defendants, as a means of circumventing the company’s 
veil of incorporation to reach directors, shareholders or related companies who might 
in one way or another have been involved in a company’s alleged wrongdoing. 
Indeed, the use of tort principles for this purpose appears now to have gained 
prominence in view of the UK Supreme Court’s recent decision in Prest v Petrodel,6 
which has severely restricted, perhaps even eviscerated,7 the traditional veil-piercing 
doctrine. In this case, Lord Sumption re-interpreted many traditional instances of veil-
piercing as cases explainable by other, more conventional, private law principles. 
Although the precise analytical framework laid down by his Lordship is obiter8 and 
controversial,9 what seems clear (at least in England) is that veil-piercing is now a 
remedy of last-resort which should only be invoked if no other legal principle would 
                                                 
3 R Stevens, Torts and Rights, OUP, Oxford, 2007, p 279.  
4 Such assumptions have been castigated as ‘tendencies to mono-mania that must be resisted’: N 
McBride & R Bagshaw, Tort Law, 5th ed, Harlow, England, p 675. 
5 This denotes both the extension of liability to wider range of defendants as well as the creation of new 
forms of liability.  
6 [2013] 3 WLR 1. 
7 See B Hannigan, ‘Wedded to Saloman: Evasion, Concealment and Confusion on Piercing the Veil of 
the One-man Company’ (2013) 50 Irish Jurist 11; PW Lee, ‘The Enigma of Veil-Piercing’  (2015) 26 
ICCLR 28. 
8 The appellant had argued that various properties held by two offshore companies controlled by the 
respondent were property to which the latter was ‘entitled’ and which ought to have been transferred to 
her subsequent to their divorce. The House unaimously allowed the appeal on the ground that the 
companies held the properties on resulting trust for the respondent but rejected arguments founded on 
veil-piercing. 
9 Lord Sumption’s analysis found support only in Lord Neuberger’s speech ([2013] 3 WLR 1 at [60] – 
[61]. Lords Mance, Clarke, Wilson and Baroness Hale indicated ([2013] 3 WLR 1 at [92], [100] and 
[103]) that Lord Sumption’s formuation of the veil-piercing doctrine might be too narrow while Lord 
Walker doubted ([2013] 3 WLR 1 at [106]) if the doctrine existed at all. Commentators, too, are 
divided, as to the correctness and usefulness of Lord Sumption’s analysis. Compare, eg, H Tjio, 
“Lifting the Veil on Piercing the Veil” [2014] LMCLQ 19; R Grantham, “The Corporate Veil – An 
Ingenious Device” (2013) 32 U Queensland LJ 311; Hannigan, above n 7; R Matthews, ‘Clarification 
of the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil’ (2013) 28 JIBLR 516; Lee, above n 7; Z X Tan, ‘The 
New Era of Corporate Veil-Piercing’ (2016) 28 SAcLJ 209.  
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furnish a remedy.10 Consequently, the jurisdiction is likely to ‘[wither] into 
obselescence’11 as the focus shifts to greater use of private law principles to achieve 
results similar to veil-piercing. For some,12 this is a welcome development because 
the use of private law principles does not, unlike the veil-piercing doctrine, undermine 
the Saloman13 principle. Such a view assumes that once the company’s separate status 
remains intact, the policy considerations that previously bedevilled the courts in the 
context of veil-piercing would be irrelevant.14 
 
This article examines the issues that arise when conspiracy by unlawful means is used 
to extend liability in the same way that veil-piercing is often invoked for, that is, 
either to stretch a company’s liability to its controllers, or to enable a controller’s 
creditors to reach the assets of company under his or her control. Civil conspiracy is 
chosen as the subject of study because it holds considerable potential for such liability 
extensions. As a company may be understood as a statutorily-endorsed combination 
of capital, persons and resources, the broad application of conspiracy liability for 
intra-corporate acts effectively limits the legitimacy of such combinations. Precisely 
where the line is to be drawn between lawful and unlawful combinations raises legal 
and policy issues that cannot be adequately answered by looking only to private law 
principles. These issues will be examined chiefly by reference to English law but 
authorities from other leading Commonwealth jurisdictions will also be considered 
where relevant. 
 
By way of background, this article will briefly state the elements of civil conspiracy 
and its rationale. It then proceeds to consider the specific issues that arise when each 
element of the tort is applied to companies. It observes that the tort’s potency as a 
liability-extending mechanism far exceeds that of the veil-piercing doctrine (which 
has traditionally been applied only sparingly by reason of its murky rationale). 
Several reasons explain why that might be so. First, the tort of conspiracy is 
                                                 
10 Prest v Petrodel [2013] 3 WLR 1 at [35]. 
11 B Hannigan, Company Law, OUP, Oxford, 2016 at [3-37]. 
12See eg W Day, ‘Skirting Around the Issue: the Corporate Veil after Prest v Petrodel’ [2014] LMCLQ 
269 at 270, who argues once the analysis is shifted to private law principles, ‘[the involvement of the 
company is immaterial to the legal analysis’. See also C Witting and J Rankin, ‘Tortious Liability of 
Corporate Groups: From Control to Coordination’ (2014) 22 Tort L Rev 91 at 91 – 92 and 102.  
13 Saloman v A Saloman & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL). 
14 F Rose, ‘Raising the Corporate Sail’ [2013] LMCLQ 566 at 585 – 591. 
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conceived to regulate the conduct of individual jural persons, of which the company is 
one. As such, a company may, in theory, conspire with its directors as well as related 
companies. Veil-piercing, by contrast, is conceptually questionable because it seeks to 
negate the jural status of the company. Second, there is currently some uncertainty as 
to the tort’s elements and rationale. In particular, there is some risk that ‘unlawful 
means’ may encompass a broad range of unlawful acts (includting statutory wrongs) 
and thereby extend the tort to a wide spectrum of circumstances. Third, the authorities 
suggest that courts’ impulse is to use the tort of conspiracy as a means of arresting the 
abuse of corporate vehicles. Where companies have been used to perpetrate or 
facilitate fraudulent schemes, the courts will resist arguments that may emaciate the 
tort.  
 
However, this article also argues that the tort has to be reined in by a number of 
policy concerns peculiar to companies. Foremost among such policies is the need to 
avoid a broad regime of liability that would unduly undermine the benefits of 
incorporation and deter enterprise. In addition, an unbridled application of the tort 
may also unjustifiably subvert fundamental principles established in the realm of 
contracts and insolvency regulation. Significantly, these are the same policy concerns 
that underpinned the courts’ reluctance to disregard the company’s separate legal 
status utilising traditional veil-piercing jurisprudence. That leads to the important 
observation that whilst the tort of conspiracy may appear more doctinally palatable (in 
that it affirms rather than negates the company’s separate legal status), its application 
is ultimately not free from the policy debates that used to inform veil-piercing cases. 
A keen appreciation of how these policies are engaged is therefore necessary for the 
proper delineation of the tort in the corporate context. 
 
 
2. Civil Conspiracy – Elements, Rationale & Uncertainties 
 
The tort of conspiracy is commonly analysed as comprising two varieties, namely 
conspiracy by lawful means and unlawful means. Both forms of the tort require proof 
of agreement, intention to injure and resulting damage. In addition, lawful means 
conspiracy requires proof of ‘improper motive’ – which in practice is often equated 
  5 
with a predominant intention to injure.  Unlawful means conspiracy, on the other hand, 
is actionable only upon proof of use of a sufficient form of illegality. 
 
In practice, the application of these elements is attended by a measure of difficulty. In 
particular, there is uncertainty as how ‘intention’ and ‘unlawful means’ are to be 
determined for purposes of establishing the unlawful means conspiracy.  In OBG v 
Allen15 (‘OBG’), Lord Hoffmann had explicated the concept of ‘intention’ to mean that 
the defendant must have intended the claimant’s breach or loss either as an end in itself 
or a means to an end. Although OBG did not concern liability for conspiracy, the Court 
of Appeal applied this definition in Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd16 to unlawful 
means conspiracy. In the yet later case of Total Network SL v HM Revenue & Customs17 
(‘Total’), which concerned unlawful means conspiracy, the House of Lords did not 
expressly disagree with OBG’s formulation of intention. However, the Law Lords also 
variously referred to the notions of ‘directed at’18 and ‘targeted at’.19 It is unclear if the 
ends and means test that was propounded in OBG is in fact different from the more 
traditional formulation of ‘aimed or targeted at’. One commentator is of the view that 
the OBG test is broader as it suggests that the claimant’s harm need only be a means of 
achieving the defendant’s desired end but need not be an inevitable result of their 
combination. 20  In Wagner v Gill, 21  the New Zealand Court of Appeal noted this 
‘confused and confusing’ state of authorities and indicated a preference ‘to retain the 
requirement that the conduct must be directed at the claimant’.22 The court considered 
this to be the more satisfactory test because the distinction between ‘means’ and 
‘consequence’ may in practice be too fine and hence ‘difficult to apply in any 
meaningful way’.23 In England, however, lower courts have generally applied the OBG 
                                                 
15 [2008] 1 AC 1 at [42] and [134]; Lord Nicholls was of the same view at [164]. 
16 [2008] Ch 244 at [146]. 
17 [2008] 1 AC 1174. 
18 Ibid at [120], per Lord Hope. 
19 Ibid at [120], per Lord Mance. 
20 See H Carty, An Analysis of the Economic Torts, 2nd ed, OUP, Oxford, 2010, at p 126. Cf, C Witting, 
‘Intra-Corporate Conspiracy: An Intriguing Prospect’ (2013) 72 CLJ 178, who suggests (at 187 – 188) 
that Total should not be seen as having altered the traditional meaning of intention, which requires the 
unlawful means to be aimed or directed at the claimant.     
21 [2015] 3 NZLR 157. 
22 [2014] NZCA 336 at [104] and [106]. 
23 Ibid at [105]. But the correctness of this criticism may be doubted, for the concept of ‘means’ 
connotes causality but ‘consequence’ does not. So what has to be proved under the OBG test is that the 
defendant knew or intended the claimant’s injury as an effective means for achieving its ultimate end, 
and it follows that the mere knowledge that injury would ensue should not suffice. 
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test without reference to Total.24 Although this suggests that the OBG formulation is 
now the prevailing test, ambiguity nevertheless remains until the issue is fully 
considered by appellate courts.  
 
The other area of contention concerns what would count as ‘unlawful means’. In Total, 
the House of Lords was unequivocal that ‘unlawful means’ for purposes of a two-party 
conspiracy were not confined to civil wrongs actionable by the claimant. A common 
law crime would suffice even if it were not otherwise actionable by the claimant as a 
tort. However, their Lordships furnished scant guidance as to how far beyond traditional 
crimes the tort would extend. Cases subsequent to Total have generally eschewed the 
suggestion that any form of illegality would suffice.25 At the minimum, the breach has 
to be either a civil or a criminal wrong. But would any statutory crime suffice? In 
Digicel (St Lucia) Ltd v Cable & Wireless Plc,26 Morgan J was inclined to the view that 
all crimes (including all non-actionable statutory offences) are unlawful acts for 
purposes of unlawful means conspiracy. But such an approach would significantly 
broaden the tort, and is not in any event supported by their Lordships’ dicta in Total.27 
Yet if the true position were that only some crimes would suffice, it is far from clear 
how the relevant crimes are to be identified.  
 
The perplexities just described reflect, in large part, the tort’s inadequate conceptual 
foundation. The anomaly of lawful means conspiracy is too well recognised. It assumes 
that a combination has the magical power to transform a lawful act into an unlawful 
one though it is not clear why that is necessarily so.28 Until the House of Lords’ decision 
                                                 
24 See Baldwin v Berryland Books [2010] EWCA Civ 1440 at [48]; Aerostar Maintenance 
International Ltd v Wilson [2010] EWHC 2032 (Ch) at [174]; Thames Valley Housing Assoc Ltd v 
Elegant (Guernsey) Ltd [2011] EWHC 1288 (Ch) at [104]; WH Newson Holding Ltd v IMI plc [2012] 
EWHC 3680 (Ch) at [35] (the court’s finding was reversed on appeal but no criticism was made of the 
test itself: see WH Newson Holding Ltd v IMI plc [2014] Bus LR 156 at [37] – [44]); and Digicel (St 
Lucia) Ltd v Cable & Wireless Plc [2010] EWHC 774 (Ch) Annex I at para 83.  
25 Digicel (St Lucia) Ltd v Cable & Wireless Plc [2010] EWHC 774 (Ch) at [187], [196], [418] and 
Annex I at [62]; Anthony McGill v The Sports and Entertainment Media Group [2014] EWHC 3000 
(QB) at [172]. 
26 [2010] EWHC 774 (Ch.) at [410] and at  [53] – [54] of Annex I.  
27 Lord Walker did not seem to have an ‘all-crimes’ approach in mind as he ruled out the possibility of 
an absolute rule that applies to all circumstances, while Lord Mance expressly cautioned that only 
some but not all crimes would suffice and Lord Scott alluded to a discretionary approach by stressing 
that the conduct must be ‘sufficiently reprehensible’: see Total Network SL v HM Revenue & Customs 
[2008] 1 AC 1174 at [56], [96], [119]. 
28 The most cited passage is that of Lord Diplock in Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) 
[1982] AC 173 at 189. 
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in Total, it was generally assumed that this anomaly was confined to the lawful means 
tort and hence tolerated by reason of its relative rarity. In Total, however, the House of 
Lords extended this anomaly to unlawful means conspiracy when it explicated both 
varieties as a single tort.29 The result is that for both varieties of the tort, ‘it is in the fact 
of conspiracy that the unlawfulness resides.’30 As we have seen, this enables the court 
in Total to extend ‘unlawful means’ to non-actionable common law crimes but has also 
introduced chaos given the lack of clarity on how ‘unlawfulness’ should be delimited. 
Unsurprisingly, this outcome has been criticised for making the tort ‘even more 
anomalous’.31 Nevertheless, the consequential expansion of the tort to encompass non-
actionable unlawful acts has been endorsed in other Commonwealth jurisdictions.32  
  
For some, Total is a regrettable development signalling an ‘interventionist’ tendency 
that would likely enlarge the tort’s capacity as a ‘gap-filling’ mechanism.33 Others, 
however, have interpreted Total to be of very limited application as it would only be 
in very rare circumstances where a common law crime would not also be actionable 
as a tort, and the civil actionability of statutory offences should in any event be 
governed by Parliamentary intention.34 Nevertheless, until such time when there is 
further elucidation of its scope, it seems clear that the tort as it is currently shaped 
leaves considerable room for judicial lawmaking. What is more, if a liberal approach 
were adopted of its application to intra-corporate (between a company and its 
controllers and agents) and intra-group (between companies of the same group) 
activites, its liabtility-extending effects can only be exacerbated.35  
 
3. Two Conceptual Pitfalls 
                                                 
29 Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] 1 AC 1174 at [41], [44], [56] and 
[221]. See also Kuwait oil Tanker Co SAK v Al Bader [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 271 at [107] – [108]. 
30 Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] 1 AC 1174 at [41] (per Lord 
Hope, citing Lord Wright in Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch [1942] AC 435 at 
462). 
31 M Matthews, J Morgan & C O’Cinneide, Hepple and Matthews’ Tort: Cases and Materials, OUP, 
Oxford, 6th ed, 2009 at 889. 
32 See, eg, Wagner v Gill [2015] 3 NZLR 157 at [71] (New Zealand) and Beckkett Pte Ltd v Deutsche 
Bank AG [2009] 3 SLR (R) 452 at [120] and EFT Holding, Inc v Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd 
[2014] 1 SLR 860 at [91] (Singapore). 
33 H Carty, ‘The Tort of Conspiracy as a Can of Worms’ in S Pitel, J Neyers and E Chamberlain, Tort 
Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (Hart Publishing, 2013)  
34 L Hoffmann, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Economic Torts’ in S Degeling, J Edelman and J Goudkamp, 
Torts in Commercial Law (Thomson Reuters, 2011) at 115 – 116.  
35 A point noted by Morgan J in Digicel (St Lucia) Ltd v Cable & Wireless Plc [2010] EWHC 774 
(Ch), Annex I at para 61. 
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Before embarking on the anlaysis of corporate conspiracies proper,  it is helpful to 
identify two conceptual pitfalls that should be avoided. The first is the fact that a 
company is a ‘separate legal person’ does not, in and of itself, prescribe any particular 
legal consequence.36 As a statutory construct, a company’s rights, powers and 
privileges are conferred by legislation. The ambit and effects of such legislation are 
determined not by particular logical attributes of ‘legal personality’ but the policy 
considerations that underpin the legislation.37 In the context of civil conspiracy, the 
proposition that a company is a separate legal person who could be liable for 
conspiring with others (including its own controllers) is essentially a conclusion that 
such liability ought in some circumstances to arise, but it is not by itself a formula that 
elucidates what those circumstances are.38 
 
A second analytical pitfall to avoid is the assumption that there are particular 
corporate law constructs that dictate how liability is to be shared by or allocated to a 
company and its agents. A prime example is the identification ‘doctrine’, which 
presupposes that a company’s conduct and/or state of mind can always be located in a 
person or persons who can properly be said to be its alter ego or ‘directing mind and 
will’. A corollary of this principle further assumes that once a particular act or mental 
state is attributed to a company on this basis, it will necessarily be ‘dis-attributed’ to 
the alter ego so that the company and the alter ego cannot be liable for the same 
wrong.39 Both principles are founded on an ‘organic approach’ to attribution, which 
assumes the individual actor to be the ‘very embodiment of the company itself’.40 On 
this view, ‘identification’ confers immnunity on the alter ego from liability and 
renders a ‘conspiracy’ between a company and its alter ego a conceptual 
impossibility. But we now know that the dis-attribution principle is fallacious. A 
                                                 
36 As Smith pointedly observed (B Smith, ‘Legal Personality’ (1928) 37 Yale L J 283 at 298): 
It is not part of legal personality to dictate conclusions. To insist that because it has been decided that a 
corporation is a legal person for some purposes it must therefore be a legal person for all purposes. … is to 
make … corporate personality … a master rather than a servant, and to decide legal questions on irrelevant 
considerations without inquiry into their merits.  
37 N James, ‘Separate Legal Personality: Legal Reality and Metaphor’ (1993) 5 Bond L Rev 217 at 220. 
38 PW Lee, ‘The Company and its Directors as Co-conspirators’ (2009) 21 SAcLJ 409 at [22].  
39 See eg, R Grantham and C Rickett, ‘Directors’ Tortious Liability: Contract, Tort or Company Law?’ 
(1999) 62 MLR 133; S Watson, ‘Conceptual Confusion: Organs, Agents and Identity in the English 
Courts’ (2011) 23 SAcLJ 762. 
40 R Grantham and C Rickett, ‘Attributing Responsibility to Corporate Entities: A Doctrinal Approach’ 
(2001) 19 Company and Securities Law Journal 168 at 170. 
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corporate agent who is ‘identified’ with the company for some purposes may remain 
personally liable for those torts that he or she commits in the course of employment.41 
Dis-attribution is a ‘heresy’ founded on the specious idea that the company and its 
alter ego somehow constitute a metaphysical union entailing specific logical 
consequences.42 That no such union resides in the idea of ‘identification’ is now 
confirmed by the UK Supreme Court in Bilta (UK) Ltd v Nazir (No 2) (‘Bilta’).43 
Specifically, there is no requirement that a company must be identified with its 
‘directing mind and will’ for all purposes. Rather, the ‘directing mind and will’ of the 
company is better understood as:44 
 
the product of a process of attribution in which the court seeks to identify the purpose 
of the statutory or common law rule or contractual provision which might require 
attribution in order to give effect to that purpose. 
 
By laying to quietus the ‘organic approach’ to attribution, this clarification also 
removes a significant conceptual impediment to the establishment of a conspiracy 
between and company and its alter ego. As there is no a priori assumption that the 
company is always merged with its alter ego as one legal entity, a company could in 
principle be liable for conspiring with its alter ego provided there are sufficient policy 
reasons to justify such liability.  
 
4. Corporate Conspiracies – Specific Issues 
 
A company may incur liability for civil conspiracy either vicariously or as a primary 
tortfeasor. A company is vicariously liable if two or more of its employees combine to 
form a tortious conspiracy in the course of their employment. In the alternative, a 
company may itself unlawfully conspire with any other legal or natural person, 
                                                 
41 Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp (Nos 2 & 4) [2003] 1 AC 959.  
42 N Cambell and J Armour, ‘Demystifying the Civil Liability of Corporate Agents’ (2003) 62 CLJ 290 
at 296. See also S Lo, ‘Dis-Attribution Fallacy and Directors’ Tort Liabilities’ (2016) 30 Aust Jnl of 
Corp Law 215.  
43 [2015] 2 WLR 1168. 
44 Ibid at [202] (per Lords Toulson and Hodge). This approach was favoured also by Lord Mance (at 
[37] – [44]) and Lords Neuberger, Clarke and Carnworth (at [9]). Lord Sumption, on the other hand, 
adhered to the idea that the state of mind of a company’s ‘directing mind and will’ is attributable to the 
company for all purposes subject to relevant exceptions (at [68] – [69]). 
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including its agents, controllers and related companies.45 Our discussion here is 
primarily concerned with this latter scenario where the company is liable as a primary 
tortfeasor.  
 
A conspiracy alleged between a company and its insiders (that is, directors and 
controllers) is often viewed with particular scepticism because, as noted, a finding of 
conspiracy in such circumstance has the effect of unravelling a combination (that is, 
the company) that is statutorily authorised in the first place. In broad terms, a 
company is a legitimate combination of capital, expertise and resources. Modern 
corporate statutes generally impose no restriction on the ends that such combinations 
may pursue.46 Allowing claimants to sue a company for unlawfully combining with 
insiders, however, undermines such autonomy by extending the company’s liability to 
unlawful acts in respect of which the company was not the primary perpetrator. At the 
same time, inroads are made to the limited liability principle as the tort enables the 
claimant to reach those standing behind the corporate veil, or to allow the controller’s 
creditors to access the company’s assets. Obviously, therefore, the wider the 
conspiracy tort, the more severe would be the potential encroachment on these 
company law policies. 
 
With these considerations in mind, the discussion below will examine the specific 
issues that arise when the tort is applied to intra-corporate and intra-group activities. It 
will utilise unlawful means conspiracy as the paradigm because it is this branch of the 
tort that has been pleaded with much greater success in practice.47  
 
(a) Agreement 
 
The agreement or combination is, of course, the gist of the tort. As a legal entity with 
its own decision-making organs, the company is well capable of forming such 
                                                 
45 Digicel (St Lucia) Ltd v Cable & Wireless Plc [2010] EWHC 774 (Ch), Annex I at [77]. 
46 See eg, s 31(1) of the Companies Act 2006 (UK); s 124 Corporations Act 2001 (Australia) and s 
23(1) Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 ed) (Singapore).  
47 A search of UK cases on Westlaw database for the period between 2011 to 2015 (both years 
included) reveals only one case in which conspiracy to injure was said to be established: see Apax 
Global Payment & Technologies v Morina [2011] EWHC 2983 at [42]. But this case is arguably not a 
‘true’ instance of lawful means conspiracy as elements of unlawfulness (such as fraud and breach of 
fiduciary duties) were also established. 
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agreements or combinations with other natural or legal persons. When applied to 
combinations between companies and their directors, however, this requirement has 
given rise to two difficulties. The first is conceptual: can a company ‘conspire’ with 
its sole director or alter ego? The second is evidential: what type of conduct or 
circumstance would constitute ‘agreement’ on the part of (a) the company and (b) the 
director? 
  
Taking these issue areas in the order set out above, the first is founded on the 
objection that in a case involving a one-man company, there can be no true meeting 
of ‘two independent minds’. For purposes of criminal law, it has been held that such 
a conspiracy is impossible as a matter of English law.48 That is understandable given 
the risk of double jeopardy – to hold otherwise may result in a director being 
punished twice over for the same offence. But it is arguable that different 
considerations apply in the civil context, where the remedy sought is primarily that of 
compensation. Indeed, a growing body of authorities49 now accepts that a sole 
director can conspire with the company he or she controls for purposes of 
establishing tortious liability.  
  
In Barclay Pharmaceuticals Limited v Waypharm LP (‘Barclay’),50 the claimant, 
Barclay, was an importer and wholesaler which had for some time purchased 
pharmaceatical products from Wayharm, a limited partnership effectively owned and 
managed by one Mekni. Mekni also owned and controlled Best Financial Services 
Corporation Barclay (‘BFSC’), which appeared to have been used largely to perform 
treasury functions within the group of companies owned by Mekni. The claimant 
brought a suit alleging, inter alia, that Mekni, Waypharm and BFSC had conspired to 
defraud it of substantial sums by presenting false invoices under a letter of credit in 
respect of goods that were either not delivered or substantially less than what was 
represented. In defence, Mekni argued that he could not be liable for conspiring with 
Waypharm and BFSC as that would be tantamount to conspiring with himself. Citing 
                                                 
48 R v McDonnell (1966) 50 Cr App R 5. 
49 For UK, see Barclay Pharmaceuticals Limited v Waypharm LP [2012] EWHC 306; Concept Oil 
Services Limited v EN-GIN Group LLP [2013] EWHC 1897 (Comm); for New Zealand, Wagner v Gill 
[2015] 3 NZLR 157; and for Singapore, Nagase Singapore Pte Ltd v Chng Kai Huat [2007] 3 SLR 
265; Lim Leong Huat v Chip Hup Hup Kee Construction Pte Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 318; and Total 
English Learning Global Pte Ltd v Kids Counsel Pte Ltd [2014] SGHC 258. 
50 [2012] EWHC 306. 
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Taylor v Smith in support,51 Gloster J rejected this argument and held that both 
Waypharm and BFSC were parties to the conspiracy. In coming to this conclusion, 
her honour took note of the fact that BSFC had no corporate purpose except to ‘front’ 
Mekni’s dealings and act as a money box that disperses the latter’s ill-gotten gains to 
other companies that he owned.52 This was therefore ‘a clear case where the corporate 
machinery of the various companies was being used, or, more accurately, abused, by 
Mr Mekni as controller to damage the claimant [Barclay].’53 This suggests that the 
question whether a company could conspire with its sole controller is not one of 
metaphysics but of policy: the law’s conception of the parties as distinct persons in 
this context is ultimately a legal device for ensuring that those who perpetrate wrongs 
cannot evade liability through the use of corporate vehicles.   
 
Cases such as Barclay suggest that there is some impetus for developing the tort of 
conspiracy broadly to strengthen the law’s grip on unlawful combinations. However, 
the tort’s actual reach is also determined by the content that makes up the element.  It 
is necessary, therefore, to understand the circumstances or conduct that would suffice 
as evidence of a company’s ‘agreement’. It is well established that the agreement or 
combination need not be explicit but may be tacit or inferred from the parties’ acts.54 
Such inferences, however, are not to be lightly drawn as conspiracy, like fraud, is a 
serious claim for which particularly cogent evidence is required. If a company had 
approved of an agreement through one of its decision-making organs (ie, the board or 
shareholders’ meeting), that would be undisputed evidence of its agreement to 
participate in the conspiracy.55 More often, however, a company’s ‘agreement’ is 
inferred from its role in the alleged conspiracy and the gravity of the illegal means or 
object. This means that even though the requirement of ‘agreement’ is conceptually 
distinct from the elements of intention and unlawful means, in reality it is often 
derived from an assessment of the latter.56 In general, the more reprehensible the 
unlawful acts, the more likely it is that the company would be taken to have ‘agreed’ 
                                                 
51 [1991] IR 142. 
52 Barclay Pharmaceuticals Limited v Waypharm LP [2012] EWHC 306 at [224]. 
53 Barclay Pharmaceuticals Limited v Waypharm LP [2012] EWHC 306 at [226]. 
54 Kuwait Oil Tanker Co SAK v Al Bader [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 271 at [111]. 
55 This occurred, for eg, in Belmont Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd [1979] 1 Ch 
250 (although the company was ultimately not held to be a party to the conspiracy since it was the 
victim of the conspiracy and the guilty knowledge of the directors could not therefore be imputed to it). 
56 The ‘Dolphina’ [2012] 1 SLR 992 at [263]. 
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to the conspiracy provided it can also be imputed with knowledge of the illegality. 
Thus, in a case such as Barclay, where the conduct complained of involves fraud, the 
fact of ‘agreement’ would quite readily be inferred: Gloster J was prepared to infer 
BSFC’s agreement from the fact of Mekni’s control and BSFC’s role as a laundering 
agent of the group’s ill-gotten gains.57 Likewise, in The Dolphina,58 a company 
(‘Universal’) alleged to have been a party to a conspiracy had three directors but only 
one of them (‘Kwan’) was active in running its business. In those circumstances, the 
Singapore High Court was prepared to impute Kwan’s guilty knowledge to Universal, 
and to infer its ‘agreement’ from its failure to take steps to prevent a fraudulent course 
of conduct. That the element of ‘agreement’ may be proved by inference thus 
provides a measure of malleability that can be exploited to expand the tort’s ambit. 
 
In cases where a conspiracy is alleged between a company and directors who are not 
its controllers, a further difficulty arises as to what conduct on the part of the director 
would suffice as evidence of ‘agreement’. Obviously, a wide conception of such 
conduct may over-expand directors’ liability and unduly dampen entrepreneurial risk-
taking. This may be why some authorities suggest that a director cannot be taken to 
have conspired with the company or other directors merely by discharging his or her 
constitutional functions. Thus, in Posluns v Toronto Stock Exchange, a decision of the 
Ontario High Court, it was said that:59 
 
the directors of a corporation do not make an ‘agreement’ in the conspiracy sense by 
voting the same way. They individually make the same decision. In the popular sense 
they are ‘in agreement’, but in the sense in which the law of conspiracy uses ‘agree’ 
they were not. Each simply expressed an individual opinion and the majority opinion 
prevailed. A contrary view would bring extraordinary consequences. One of its 
implications would be that each time the majority of a Board of Directors voted to 
have the corporation pursue a course of action which ultimately turned out to be 
illegal, those who were in favour of having the corporation act as it did would be 
conspirators by reason solely of having so voted. 
 
In England, a similar reasoning has been adopted in the context of joint tortfeasance. 
                                                 
57 [2012] EWHC 306 at [223].  
58 [2012] 1 SLR 992. 
59 (1964) 46 DLR (2d) 210 (Ont HC) at [328] (per Gale J). 
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The relevant test here is whether a director could be said to have ‘authorised, directed 
or procured’ the company’s tort.60 In MCA Records Inc v Charly Records Ltd I 
(‘Charly Records’), Chadwick LJ stated that: 61 
 
a director will not be treated as liable with the company as a joint tortfeasor if he does 
no more than carry out his constitutional role in the governance of the company – that 
is to say, by voting at board meetings. That, I think, is what policy requires if a proper 
recognition is to be given to the identity of the company as a separate legal person. 
 
The correctness of this approach has, however, been doubted as it is not apparent why 
directors should acquire immunity merely because they had authorised an unlawful 
act as a board. Some commentators contend that this ‘constitutional exception’ should 
be discarded as it is no more than a vestige of the ‘dis-attribution fallacy’ – the 
mistaken assumption that directors are immune from personal liability once their acts 
are identified as those of the company’s.62 
 
In this writer’s view, however, the ‘constitutional exception’ is founded on something 
more than a misapprehension of the effects of identification. In both the contexts of 
joint tortfeasance and civil conspiracy, the exception reflects the court’s attempt at 
mediating competing policies.63 On the one hand, there is the truism that each person 
should bear responsibility for his or her own wrongdoing. On the other, there is real 
concern that a broad regime of personal liability would inhibit enterprise. This is 
particularly so if a company operates in a highly regulated environment cluttered with 
strict-liability offences. Requiring directors to have done ‘something more’ than 
merely discharge their constitutional functions is an attempt at striking an appropriate 
balance between these conflicting concerns. Although this exception is not without 
difficulty, it serves to emphasise the threshold principle that a director is not liable for 
                                                 
60 It has, however, been argued that this form of liability is more accurately analysed as accessorial 
liability rather than joint tortfeasance: see see J Dietrich & P Ridge, Accessories in Private Law, CUP, 
Cambridge, 2015 at 386.  
61 [2003] 1 BCLC 93. This approach has been applied in Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Princo 
Digital Disc GmbH [2004] 2 BCLC 50 and Società Esplosivi Industriali Spa v Ordnance Technologies 
(UK) Ltd [2008] 2 BCLC 428.  
62 S Lo, ‘Dis-Attribution Fallacy and Directors’ Tort  Liabilities’ (2016) 30 Aust J of Corp Law 215 at 
222; N Foster, ‘Personal Civil Liability of Company Officers for Company Workplace Torts’ (2008) 
16 TLJ 20 at 41. 
63 See Mentmore Manufacturing Co Inc v National Merchandising Manufacturing Co Inc (1978) 89 
DLR (3rd) 195 at [23]. 
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a company’s wrongdoing simply by reason of the office he or she holds, nor that any 
participation in a constitutional capacity equals ‘authorisation, direction or 
procurement’.64 Transposed to the context of conspiracy, such an approach may 
suggest that mere acquiescence in a board resolution would not suffice65 but active 
participation in the design of an unlawful scheme (whether carried out in the course of 
or outside board meetings) could constitute an ‘agreement’ in the conspiracy sense. 
 
Of course, as the experience in relation to joint tortfeasance has shown, exactly what 
has to be proved beyond the fact of acquiescence admits of no easy answer.66 In 
Keller v LED Technologies Pty Ltd (‘Keller’),67 a majority of the Federal Court of 
Australia held that a director would only be jointly liable for the company’s tort if he 
or she had authorised or procured the tort in a capacity other than that of a director.68 
For Jessup J, this meant that ‘the context must be such that the director is effectively 
standing apart from the company and directing or prucuring it as a separate entity’ so 
that there is ‘a sense in which the director is using the company as the instrument of 
his or her own wrong’.69 On this view, a director who does no more than discharge in 
good faith his or her duties to the company would not ordinarily incur liability for the 
                                                 
64 That this is likely what Chadwick LJ had in mind in Charly Records is supported by the fact that his 
Honour derived ([2003] 1 BCLC 93 at [49]) the principle from a statement made by Aldous LJ in 
Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 1 BCLC 689 at [17], which was in turn based on 
Slade LJ’s statement in C Evans Ltd v Spritebrand Ltd 1 WLR at 329 that: 
The authorities … clearly show that a director of a company is not automatically to be identified with his 
company for the purpose of the law of tort, however small the company may be and however powerful his 
control over its affairs. Commercial enterprise and adventure is not to be discouraged by subjecting a director 
to such onerous potential liabilities. In every case where it is sought to make him liable for his company’s 
torts, it is necessary to examine with care what part he played personally in regard to the act or acts 
complained of. 
65 A person is not a party to a conspiracy unless he or she has also taken steps to further the common 
design: see Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Export Credit Guarantee Department [1998] 
Lloyd’s Law Rep 19 at 35. See also Grupo Torreas SA v Al-Sabah [1999] CLC 1469 where Mance J 
observed (at 107) that ‘weak and incompetent acquiescence is one thing, participation in conspiracy 
another.’  
66 In England, the position since Charly Records appears to require some personal involvement on the 
part of the director, but such an approach may favour directors of large companies over those of 
smaller companies, since the former are better able to distance themselves from the implementation of 
particular policies. In Canada, the position appears to be that a director is personally liable for a 
company’s tort if he ‘makes the wrong his own’: Mentmore Manufacturing Co Inc v National 
Merchandising Manufacturing Co Inc (1978) 89 DLR (3rd) 195, but this test has been criticised as 
‘indeterminate and possibly circular’ in so far as there is a lack of clarity as to what it entails: see J 
Farrar, ‘The Personal Liability of Directors for Corporate Torts’ (1997) 9 Bond L Rev 102 at 108. 
Another approach suggested by Dietrich & Ridge is that a director should only incur liability for 
directing or procuring a wrongdoing if he or she knew of the relevant illegality: see J Dietrich & P 
Ridge, Accessories in Private Law, CUP, Cambridge, 2015 at 392, 394 and 400. 
67 (2010) 185 FCR 449. 
68 Ibid at [83] and [404].  
69 Ibid at [404]. 
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company’s torts.70 This limited immunity is therefore largely justified on policy 
grounds – that those who serve the company ought not to be exposed to greater 
liability (at the suit of third parties) than the proprietors themselves.71 Joint 
tortfeasance on the ‘direct or procure’ basis is conceptually distinct from that of 
liability for conspiracy but the same policy concern underpins the latter context. A 
case can therefore be made for extending the same approach to conspiracies, so that 
directors acting in good faith in the company’s interests would not normally be 
regarded as ‘combining’ with the company. Such an approach would represent a 
refinement of and improvement over the ‘constitutional exception’ as liability is 
predicated not on the form but on the substantive capacity of the director’s 
participation.  
 
More pertinently, the foregoing discussion demonstrates that the use of conspiracy as 
a means of extending liability in the corporate context is not free from the policy 
concerns that have traditionally plagued the veil-piercing doctrine. In both contexts, it 
is necessary to consider the extent to which a company’s separate legal status is 
undermined by visiting liability on those who serve merely as its ‘arms and legs’. The 
attempt in Keller to confine tortious liability to situations where directors have used 
the company ‘as instrument of his or her own wrong’ is redolent of the ‘alter ego ‘ 
arguments commonly invoked to pierce the corporate veil.  
  
(b) Intention 
 
A party to an unlawful conspiracy is only liable if he or she has intended to cause loss 
to the claimant. For a corporate conspirator, this culpable state of mind is necessarily 
located in that of a natural person. Traditionally, it was assumed there are two routes 
by which such mental state may be attributed to a company. The first is to utilise 
agency principles. In general, a principal may be imputed with the knowledge that its 
agents acquire while acting within the scope of his or her authority.72 This would 
mean, in the context of unlawful combinations, that a company will be affixed with 
                                                 
70 Ibid at [406]. 
71 Ibid at [403]. 
72 P Watts & F M B Reynolds (eds), Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, Sweet & Maxwell, 20th Ed, 
2014 at para 8-207. 
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the intention of the agent purportedly conspiring on its behalf.   
 
That a company may be affixed with the mental state of an agent acting illegally 
presupposes that the company has the capacity to authorise its agents to commit 
unlawful acts. In a recent work, Professor Peter Watts argued that such capacity is 
implicit in modern corporation statutes that confer on companies the vires to do 
anything that an individual can do.73 Since an individual can commit unlawful acts, it 
follows that a company is similarly empowered and may authorise others to do the 
same. On this view, the company would be attributed the mental state of the agent 
authorised to effect those acts (including illegal acts) constituting the alleged 
conspiracy. But while a company may (through its board) authorise anyone, including 
junior officers, to commit unlawful acts, express authorisation of illegality is likely to 
be rare. More usually, it would be the board itself, and perhaps the managing director, 
would have the implied authority to act illegally.74 That may, in turn, suggest that the 
relevant mens rea would more often than not be located in the board or senior 
officers. However, it is unclear if ‘authority’ would for this purpose encompass 
ostensible authority. If it does, the company’s potential liability would obviously 
enlarge.75 
 
A second mode of attribution is that of ‘identification’. In Meridian Global Funds 
Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission,76 Lord Hoffmann expounded this 
principle as a special rule of attribution to be employed when the context precludes 
attribution based on agency or various liability by requiring the company itself to have 
committed an act or bear a particular mental state.77 The rule is fashioned by 
interpreting the substantive rule in question, taking into account its language and 
policy, and asking: “[whose] act (or knowledge, or state of mind) was for this purpose 
intended to count as the act etc of the company?”78 So stated, ‘identification’ is 
                                                 
73 P Watts, ‘Directors as Agents – Some Aspects of Disputed Territory’ in D Busch, L Macgregor & P 
Watts, Agency Law in Commercial Practice, OUP, Oxford, 2016, p 111.   
74 Watts, above n 73, p 111.  
75 Difficult questions may also arise as to whether an agent could represent his or her own authority: 
Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA (The Ocean Frost) [1986] AC 717; First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian 
International Bank Ltd [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 194.  
76 [1995] 2 AC 500. 
77 [1995] 2 AC 500 at 507. 
78 [1995] 2 AC 500 at 507. 
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analytically distinct from agency rules.79 The former focuses on the context and 
purpose of the rule for which attribution is sought, while the latter relies on the 
concept of ‘authority’ to identify the relevent ‘directing mind’.  
 
Between the two, ‘identification’ appears to be the more generous rule. In El Ajou v 
Dollar Land Holdings plc,80 a case concerned with dishonest receipt of trust monies, 
the English Court of Appeal held that the guilty knowledge of one F, a director of a 
company, DLH, could not be attributed to the company under agency rules because F 
did not acquire such knowledge in the course of his directorship with DHL. However, 
the court then held that the same knowledge could be attributed to DLH on the ground 
that F was its ‘directing mind and will’. For this purpose, it did not matter that F was 
in fact a non-executive and nominee director with no general management power. 
What mattered was that it was F who executed the transactions involving the 
fraudulent proceeds and thus had ‘de facto management and control over the 
transactions’.81 In The Dolphina,82 it was similarly held that knowledge acquired by a 
director outside his directorship could not be attributed to the company on agency 
rules but was attributable on the basis of identification for purposes of deciding if the 
company had unlawfully conspired with others. The director in this case was one of 
three directors on the company’s board, but he could nevertheless be regarded as the 
company’s ‘directing mind and will’ as he was the only director actively and routinely 
involved in the company’s business.83 These cases reflect a pragmatic approach to 
questions of attribution. The company’s ‘directing mind and will’ could be different 
persons for different purposes.84 Where a company has in fact engaged in an illegal 
transaction, the courts would be prepared to attribute the guilty knowledge of the 
                                                 
79 The relationship between agency and the special rule of attribution was not discussed by the Law 
Lords in Bilta, but their Lordships appeared to have reasoned on the assumption that they are distinct 
rules: see eg, Bilta (UK) Ltd v Nazir (No 2) [2015] 2 WLR 1168 at [40] and [187] – [190]. Watts, 
however, has argued that directors always act as agents even when they act collectively as a board and 
hence the distinction between agency and special rule of attribution may be more apparent than real: 
see generally, Watts, above n 73. 
80  [1994] 2 All ER 685. But the rejection of agency principles in this case has been criticised: see P 
Watts, ‘The Company’s Alter Ego – An Imposter in Private Law’ (2000) 116 LQR 525 at 529.   
81 [1994] 2 All ER 685 at 697. 
82 [2012] 1 SLR 992. 
83 [2012] 1 SLR 992 at [254] – [255]. In a similar vein, information possessed by only one director that 
is not shared with other directors, however acquired, may be presumed to be information possessed by 
the company: see Mohammed Jafari-Fini v Skillglass Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 261; affirmed by the 
Privy Council in Lebon v Aqua Salt Co Ltd [2009] BCC 425. 
84 [1994] 2 All ER 685 at 699. 
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person who is in the position to commit the company to that transaction.85 
  
(c) Unlawful means 
 
We have already seen that precisely what would count as ‘unlawful means’ for 
purposes of the conspiracy tort is currently unsettled.86 Interestingly, applications in 
the corporate context suggest that the scope of ‘unlawful means’may also be 
constrained by policy concerns specific to that context. 
 
A well-established example of such restriction is the rule in Said v Butt,87 which 
provides that a servant who in good faith procured or authorised his or her master’s 
breach of contract is not liable for inducing breach of contract. Subsequent cases 
extended the rule to exempt agents from liability for conspiring to breach the 
principlal’s contracts.88 Although its rationale was stated in Said v Butt to lie in the 
identity of the servant with the master,89 this rule is better understood as a corollary of 
the contractual privity rule. Having contracted with a specific principal, a third party 
cannot (by gaining a right of action against the agent) be placed ‘in a better position 
than if he had dealt with a party who did not employ agents.’90 So while a breach of 
contract may, in general, be a sufficient form of illegality for purposes of the 
conpiracy tort, it is not a basis for civil action where the alleged conspiracy is that 
between a principal (company) and its agents (directors) acting in good faith.  
 
In the more recent case of Wagner v Gill,91 the New Zealand Court of Appeal also 
made explicit use of policy considerations to determine if a director’s breach of 
fiduciary obligation is a sufficient form of ‘unlawful means’. In this case, the claimant 
(Wagner) was owed a sum of money by DPL, which debt was guaranteed by BAP. 
Both DPL and BAP were companies controlled by the defendant, Gill. The claimant 
                                                 
85 But such an approach would not be as broad as that suggested by Witting, that the company should 
be presumed to have the intention of its co-conspirator once actions have been taken which are 
consistent with that intention: see Witting, above n 20, at 199.  
86 See text to above nn 25 - 27. 
87 [1920] 2 KB 497. 
88 G Scammell, Ltd v Hurley (1928) 1 KB 419; O’Brien v Dawson (1942) 66 CLR 18. 
89 ‘He [the servant] is not a stranger. He is the alter ego of his master. His acts are in the law the acts of 
his employer.’: Said v Butt [1920] 2 KB 497 at 505, per McCardie J.  
90 Watts and Reynolds, above n 72, at [9-121]. 
91 [2015] 3 NZLR 157. 
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succeeded in obtaining an arbitral award against DPL for the unpaid sums, but both 
DPL and BAP went into receivership before the award could be enforced. It 
subsequently transpired that Gill had transferred a profitable contract from BAP to 
BMAC (another Gill entity) prior to BAP’s receivership. The claimant then brought 
proceedings against Gill and the entities he controlled, alleging that they had 
conspired to strip BAP of its assets so as to defeat the claims of creditors.  
 
At trial, it was established that Gill had breached his fiduciary duty to BAP by 
transferring the contract out of BAP at a time when it was financially distressed, and 
he had done so to protect his personal interests. The question thus arose as to whether 
this fiduciary breach qualified as a form of ‘unlawful means’ for purposes of the   
claimant’s suit. The Court of Appeal accepted that a breach of fiduciary duty may, in 
principle, constitute a form of unlawful means but noted that whether it does so may 
depend on whether it is a two-party or three-party conspiracy.92 In this case, the 
claimant had in fact alleged a three-party conspiracy. This was because the fiduciary 
duty that was breached was owed not to the claimant but to BAP, and so the 
claimant’s real complaint was that she had been injured through the intermediary of 
BAP.93 Although the court hinted at the possibility that a breach fidciary duty owed to 
a third party might not count as ‘unlawful means’,94 it ultimately expressed no 
concluded view on that.95 Instead, it disposed of the issue largely on policy grounds. 
 
Underlining the centrality of policy considerations in this context, the Court of Appeal 
observed,96  
 
An overriding theme, however, in the economic tort cases is that the encroachment of 
the common law into the regulation of economic competition must for obvious reasons 
be subject to some limits. In cases such as this one the drawing of those limits 
ultimately depends not on close textual analysis of the authorities but largely on policy 
considerations, having regard to the underlying purpose of the tort.  
 
                                                 
92 [2015] 3 NZLR 157 at [80]. 
93 Ibid at [55].  
94 Ibid at [77]. 
95 Ibid at [80]. 
96 Ibid at [79] (emphasis added). 
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Turning to the facts, the court identified three policy considerations why a director’s 
breach of fiduciary duty by moving assets out of a company does not constitute an 
unlawful means for purposes of a conspiracy claim by a creditor. First, a creditor in 
the shoes of the claimant could have secured her interests by obtaining a personal 
guarantee from Gill at the outset. In the court’s view, this availability of self-help is 
an important factor in delimiting tort liability.97 Second, the statutory context (ie, the 
Companies Act 1993) is unambiguous that director’s duties are owed only to the 
company but not to creditors. Extending liability in tort may therefore run counter to 
parliamentary intention as reflected by the statute.98 Third, s 301 of the Companies 
Act 1993 allows a creditor of a company in liquidation to seek compensation from 
directors who might have misapplied the company’s assets. The claimant is not 
therefore without remedy and there is no gap in the law which the tort of conspiracy 
has to fill.99  
 
In Quay Kay Tee v Ong & Co Pte Ltd,100 the Singapore Court of Appeal likewise held 
that a creditor could not succeed in a claim for conspiracy to injure by fraudulent 
preference since the remedies and effects of such preferences are already regulated by 
statutory legislation. These cases thus suggest the statutory context of a claim may 
operate as a real constraint on the width of ‘unlawful means’.  The tort should not be 
used as a backdoor for circumventing important policies underpinning relevant 
statutory schemes. 
 
(d) Intra-group Conspiracies 
 
Possibly the greatest scope for circumventing the separate entity principle through 
unlawful means conspiracy is in the context of corporate groups. Once it is accepted 
that a company is a juristic person capable of tortiously ‘conspiring’ with another, 
there is, in principle, no reason why it cannot be liable for conpiring with a company 
                                                 
97 Ibid at [82]. 
98 Ibid at [84]. This consideration raises a related but distinct company law principle that would have 
been relevant in English law, which is that the claimant’s claim is essentially one for reflective loss and 
hence would in any event have been barred: Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2001] 2 WLR 72. 
99 [2015] 3 NZLR 157 at [85]. But cf C Witting and J Rankin, above n 12 at 102 (arguing that 
conspiracy by unlawful means is an appropriate means of extending liability beyond insolvent 
companies). 
100 [1996] 3 SLR(R) 637. 
  22 
within the same corporate group.101 In theory, therefore, a parent company may 
conspire with its subsidiary and two subsidiaries may conspire with each other. The 
extent to which such liability would erode the benefits of incorporation (including 
both affirmative and defensive asset partitioning102) will depend on what facts are 
held to satisfy the elements of the tort. The mere fact that a parent company has 
voting control is unlikely to suffice as an act of agreement or combination. But what 
if the parent also appoints nominees to the board of the subsidiary? Would the acts 
and knowledge of the nominees then be imputed to the parent company? It is 
arguable that so long as the nominee directors act in good faith in discharge of their 
duties to the subsidiary, their conduct and states of mind are not attributable to the 
parent company.103 If, however, the nominees had acted pursuant to a group policy 
promoted or endorsed by the parent, it may be possible to argue that the nominees 
had acted not merely as agents of the subsidiary but also as agents of the parent 
company. To attribute the conduct and states of mind of the nominees to the parent 
company in such circumstance may therefore be justified.104  
 
In reality, holding companies do, of course, routinely formulate group policies for 
adoption by their subsidiaries. To the extent that such management practice could 
form the basis of a conspiracy that exposes the parent to liabilities of its subsidiaries, 
it would significantly erode the efficacy of the group structure as an asset protection 
device. It may be that further constraints on liability will need to be evolved to avoid 
such effects. One possibility is to insist on a higher standard of culpability – that the 
parent company in formulating the policy must have done so with the intention of 
causing injury to those affected by the unlawful act. It would not suffice if the 
                                                 
101 Digicel (St Lucia) Ltd v Cable & Wireless Plc [2010] EWHC 774 (Ch) Annex I at paras 61 and 77.  
See also K Brickley, ‘Conspiracy, Group Danger and the Corporate Defendant’ (1983) 52 Cincinnati L 
Rev 431 at 440 – 442. 
102 Affirmative asset partitioning is the shielding of the company’s assets from the creditors of the 
shareholders while defensive asset partitioning is the protection of shareholders’ assets from the 
company’s creditors (ie, limited liability): see H Hansmaan and R Kraakmann, “The Essential Role of 
Organizational Law” (2000) 110 Yale LJ 387 
103 This may explain Morgan J’s observation in Digicel (St Lucia) Ltd v Cable & Wireless Plc [2010] 
EWHC 774 (Ch) Annex I at [77] that ‘it would normally not be sufficient proof of such a combination 
merely to show that the parent knew or suspected that an unlawful act was being committed and did 
nothing to stop it.’  
104 And would further be consistent with the holding in Chandler v Cape plc [2012] 1 WLR 3111 that a 
parent company that controls specific areas of a subsidiary’s operations by formulating policies and 
practices for adoption by the latter owes a duty of care to those dealing with the subsidiary. 
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nominee directors had such intention at the time of implementing the policy as a 
management organ of the subsidiary. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  
Veil-piercing has always been a troubling doctrine because its reasoning lies in the 
denial of a company’s status as a separate legal person.  Such denial contradicts the 
very raison d’être of the company. Private law principles, on the other hand, avoid 
this contradiction by imposing liability on the asumption that the company is a 
distinct legal person. As our discussion has attempted to show, however, this does not 
necessarily free the application of private law principles from the policy debates that 
used to inform veil-piercing cases. A liberal application of conspiracy liability to 
intra-corporate as well as intra-group activities would undermine the company’s 
separate legal status as well as the benefits of incorporation. So while private law 
principles may often provide a more rational basis for evaluating liability-extending 
claims, it is important to bear in mind that even here, fundamental company law 
policies have to be closely assessed. 
 
